INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1980s, the Chinese electricity industry has been undergoing a slow, but thorough reform and institutional transformation.
1 In 1985, the central government's monopoly on the development and ownership of generation was ended, so that various local governments, state-owned enterprises and even private investors-including foreign companies-could develop and own generating facilities. In 1997, the massive transmission and generation assets still held by the Ministry of Electric Power were removed from its control and put into a corporate structure, the State Power Corporation, with the objective of encouraging business style governance and management. A parallel corporate restructuring occurred for generation assets controlled by provincial and local government authorities.
In 2002, the State Power Corporation of China, which owned 90% of the nation's transmission assets and 46% of the nation's generation assets, was broken up. Two major transmission companies were organized on a geographic basis, with the State Grid
Corporation of China and its regional and provincial subsidiaries running the system in the north, central and eastern regions, and the China Southern Power Grid Corporation and its regional and provincial subsidiaries running the system in 5 provinces in the south. The major generation assets were divided up to form 5 large 'gencos' operating across regions: the Huaneng Group, the Datang Corporation, the Huadian Corporation, the Guodian Corporation and the China Power Investment Corporation. The State Electricity Regulatory Commission was created to oversee the industry, although the National Development and Reform Commission was tasked with managing the industry's contribution to the national economic goals and so remains involved with key strategic decisions about the industry's structure, including price policies.
In 2003, the government outlined its goal of developing regional wholesale power had problems. Despite the significant publicity around the creation of this and other regional markets, it is not clear whether the trials will be followed up with actual implementation and whether these markets will soon take any meaningful role in matching supply and demand in any region.
One key question is whether the ownership of the generation assets in the Northeast region is sufficiently competitive to support market bidding for wholesale power-see Sun et al. (2003) . Our paper addresses this issue. We describe the ownership structure of the generation assets for the region as a whole and broken down by province.
We also describe the ownership structure of the generation assets selected to participate in the trial operation of the Northeast China Regional Electricity Market in 2005 and 2006 . We calculate the 4-firm Concentration Ratio (CR4) and the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI). The current ownership structure exhibits modest concentration. Ownership of the subset of plants participating in the trial operation of the Regional Market is much more concentrated. Arguably, this is a troublesome obstacle to instituting some form of competitive bidding in the wholesale power market, and this may be one factor in the poor outcome of the trial operation.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY IN NORTHEAST

CHINA
For electric power purposes, the Northeast region of China encompasses the three provinces otherwise considered China's northeast region -Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang -plus the eastern portion of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, encompassing the Chifeng, Tongliao, Hinggan and Hulun Buir areas of the Region. This region is shown in Figure 1 . This is the transmission territory covered by the Northeast The document is in Chinese and the original title is given in the list of references. 4 In the remainder of this paper, we treat all plants as if they have a single owner. This is consistent with how the original sources handle the classification of ownership. However, this is not always the case. Some plants have multiple large shareholders, and in some cases power purchase contracts may alter exactly who controls the marketing of power from the plant. But the original sources have made an evaluation of who is the single controlling owner, and we have accepted that classification. We have not been able to deepen our database to have an accurate picture of the ultimate shareholder structure nor do we have information about contractual rights to the power. A more complete picture of this information could potentially alter our assessment of the measure of concentration. But attention to the ultimate shareholder structure would also have to address the problem that the state possesses a controlling stake in all five major gencos, as well as the State Grid Corporation, so that some decision has to be made about whether management decisions are being made independently at each company. This same judgment would have to be extended to treatment Using this data we provide some simple descriptive statistics about the generation assets in the Northeast region, and then we turn to an analysis of ownership concentration. All of the statistics reported appear in Table 2 .
The Northeast region has a total of 47,880 MW of generation capacity produced in 578 installations. 5 The regional breakdown of the capacity is 38% in Liaoning, 23% in Jilin, 28% in Heilongjiang, and 10% in eastern Inner Mongolia.
The average capacity of an installation is 83 MW, but the distribution of installation sizes is very skewed. There are 11 installations with a capacity of greater than 1,000 MW, although an installation can consist of several units. These large installations represent 31% of capacity in the region. There are 18 installations with a capacity between 1,000 and 500 MW, representing 26% of capacity. Another 58 installations have a capacity between 500 and 100 MW, representing 28% of capacity. There are 491
installations with a capacity less than 100 MW, a good many of which are smaller than 6
MW. These 491 small installations provide 15% of capacity. Table 3 also shows the CR4 and HHI when calculated excluding self-generation, since arguably these units would be less readily incorporated into a competitive market. Excluding selfgeneration moves the region-wide HHI from 770 to 1,035, i.e., from below the 1,000 cutoff level to just above it and so into the 'moderately concentrated' range. of the continental countries listed above. They report an HHI of 1,410 for this theoretical region-wide market.
TRIAL OPERATION OF THE NORTHEAST CHINA REGIONAL ELECTRICITY MARKET
Development of the system of regional grids and improved connections across regions is also seen as a step in the process leading to competitive wholesale power markets. One of the state gencos explained to investors:
The long-term objective for the electricity pricing reform is to establish a standardized and transparent tariff setting mechanism, classifying the electricity prices into the on-grid price, the transmission price, the distribution price and the end-user retail price, and to allow the on-grid prices and retail prices to be determined through market competition. The transmission and distribution prices are to be regulated by the government. (Huaneng Power International, 2005, p. 14)
The Northeast and the East grid regions were to begin this process. The Northeast China Table 4 and are shown in Table 3 : the CR4 is 70% and the HHI is 1,582, which is within the region normally labeled 'moderately concentrated'. This is markedly higher than the HHI for the region's total generating assets, even excluding self-generation. This contrast suggests there is potential for competition that was not taken advantage of in designing the trial market structure.
In 2006, two of the plants had dropped out of the trial operation, so that the total capacity of participating plants was 20,260 Megawatts from 26 plants. Also, one of the previously independent plants, Hunjiang, becomes owned by CPIC, raising CPIC's share 12 There are some minor discrepancies between sources. The Hunjiang plant is shown by some to be independent and by others to be owned by CPIC. Our internet search shows that CPIC took ownership in July 2005. We list it as independent for 2005 but owned by CPIC in 2006. The Annual Report states that participation was limited to thermal plants with individual unit capacity greater than 100 MW and excluding those used for combined heat and power or for self-generation. We can identify units meeting the criteria for participation in the trial that, nevertheless, were not included. Moreover, some of the units that did participate appear to be combined heat and power units. Table 3 , the CR4 is 76% and the HHI is 1,759, just slightly below the benchmark for high concentration. Table 3 also shows the provincial breakdown of these measures of market concentration. The HHI is greater than 1800 in each of the provinces, indicating a high level of concentration. In Heilongjiang, the HHI is even greater than 4000. Given the problem with transmission constraints between provinces, there might be significant concentrations of market power in these provinces for participants in the trial operation.
CONCLUSIONS
We analyze the concentration of ownership of generation assets in the Northeast region of China, a region that has been put on the forefront in the national plan for the creation of a wholesale electric power market. The government's allocation of generation to the 5 gencos was crafted to limit the concentration of assets, and our results for the region as a whole show a low level of concentration in the Northeast. However, because transmission constraints between provinces are often binding, it may be important to look at concentration at the provincial level. Here we see that the generation assets are often much more concentrated, with the exception of the province of Liaoning where there is significant self-generation and many independent producers. In order to realize the full benefits of the ownership structure at the region-wide level, it would be necessary to invest in additional generation to relieve congestion between the provinces. Alternatively, efforts could be made to reduce ownership concentration at the provincial level or to mitigate the exercise of market power. This paper does not explore the effectiveness of these options.
The trial operation of the Northeast Regional Electricity Market in 2005 and 2006 was conducted using only a subset of the region's generating assets. This subset exhibits a much stronger level of ownership concentration than the region as a whole. Arguably, this is a troublesome obstacle to instituting some form of competitive bidding in the wholesale power market, and this may be one factor in the poor outcome of the trial operation. Note: We have no ownership data for the 1% of MW capacity in plants below 6MW in size. In calculating the HHI we add zero to the HHI calculation for these plants. We also cannot match the self-generation capacity total with individual plants. To make this calculation, we assume that all of the self-generation is from units owned by companies other than the 5 gencos or the State Grid. Table 3 Measures of Concentration in the Northeast Region Excluding All Facilities Self-Generation
Figure 1 Territory of the Northeast China Regional Electricity Market
